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TEST AT COMMON LAW.
146 Mass., i89-that the clubs did
not "sell" to their members and
so were not liable under their
license acts. In 188I it was enacted
that" In any town in which the in-
habitants vote that license shall not
be grant~d all buildings or places
therein used by clubs for the pur-
pose of selling, distributing or dis-
pensing intoxicating liquors to their
members and others shall be
deemed common nuisances," and
in 1887 the statute was extended to
cover clubs in places voting for
licenses, unless they should first
take out a special club license as
required by the latter act. Under
the "selling, distributing or dis-"
pensing" clause of the Act of i881,
it was decided that a place would be
equally-a nuisance if used by a club
either to sell intoxicating liquors to
its members or to distribute among
its members intoxicating liquors
owned by them in common, or to
procure for and dispense to its
members intoxicating liquors which
was bought for and belonged to
them individually: Com. v. Reber,
152 Mass., 537; Com. v. Jacobs, 152
Mass., 276; and Com. v. Ryan, 152
Mass., 283. To escape this penalty
it would have to appear that the
club did not own any liquor; that it
neither sold, nor distributed, nor
dispensed any; that each member
kept at the club -as he might in
his dwelling-a private stock of liq-
uor, purchased either by himself or
by the steward of the club at his
special direction and as his agent
and not as the agent of the club,
and that payment for the liquor
was, in every instance, made with
money of the member to the dealer
and not to the club or any one for
it: 4 Harvard L. R., 183-4.
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Test of Crime at Common Law-Solicitation to Commit l'urder.
The test whether a certain act is a crime at common law is
whether it injuriously affects the public police and economy. Therefore,
a solicitation to commit murder, accompanied by the offer of a money
reward, is indictable as an offence at common law.
I Decided January 4, 1892. Reported in 146 Pa., 83.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The indictment charged substantially that the defen-
dant did, with force and arms, etc., unlawfully, wickedly
and maliciously solicit and invite one Samuel Kissinger,
and by the offer and promise to pay to him the sum of
"$I,ooo, did incite and encourage him, the said Samuel
Kissinger, one William S. Foltz, in the peace of the Com-
monwealth, feloniously to kill, murder and slay.
The defendant was found guilty, and, thereupon,
moved, for a new trial, and- in arrest of judgment and
assigned the reason that the indictment charged no offence
either at common law or by statute.
The Court below overruled both motions, and on appeal
to the Supreme Court, this judgment was affirmed.
OFFENCES AT COMMON LAW.
Upon being asked whether a cer-
tain act is indictable or not the
question arises, is the matter com-
plained of forbidden by a positive
law or statute, or is it contrary to
the common law?
What is "an offence at common
law ?" Blackstone in his Commen-
taries, Book IV, page 162 says,
"The last species of offences which
especially affect the Commonwealth
are those against the public police
or economy. By the public police
and economy I mean the due regu-
lation and domestic order of the
kingdom, whereby the individuals
of the State, like members of a well
governed family, are bound to con-
form their general behavior to the
rules of propriety, good neighbor-
hood, and good manners, and to be
decent, industrious, and inoffensive
in their respective stations. This
head of offences must therefore be
very miscellaneous, as it comprises
all such crimes as especially affect
public society and are not compre-
hended under any of the four pre-
ceding series."
It is indictable under the common
law in Pennsylvania as a common
nuisance, to draw together in the
streets of a city large numbers of
people by means of violent, loud
and indecent language, whereby
the public right of passage along
the street is prevented and ob-
structed. Barker v. Com., 19 Pa.,
412 (1852).
In a case decided in Massachu-
setts where the defendant was in-
dicted for illegal voting for select-
men, the Court said: "There cannot
be a doubt that the offence described
in the indictment is a misdemeanor
at common law. It is a general
principle that where a statute gives
a privilege and one wilfully violates
such privilege, the common law will
punish such violation." Com. v.
Silsbee, 9 Mass., 417 (1812), and
in Com. v. Hoxey, 16 Mass., 385
(1820), an indictment at common
law for disturbing a town meeting
was sustained. Likewise in Penn-
sylvania, to disturb a meeting of a
board of school directors was held
to be a common law offence. Cam-
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bell v. Corn., 59 Pa., 266 (i868).
Among the different offences which
may be indicted and punished t
common law are the following:
Common brawlers, Com. v. Foley,
99 Mass., 497 (1868); common
scolds, James v. Com., 12 S. & R.
(Pa.), 220 (1825); Com. v. Mohn, 52
Pa., 243 (1866); anything shocking
the religious sense of the commu-
nity, State v. Pepper, 68 N. C., 259
(1873); Updegraph v. Cor., it S.
'& R. (Pa.), 394 (1824); any acts
prejudicial to publichealth, Vfeeker
v. Van Renselear, 15 Wend., 397
(1836); State v. Buckman, 8 N. H.,
203 (1836); exposing a person or
animal suffering from disease, Rex
v. Vantandillo, 4 M. &S., 73 (18&5);
eavesdropping, Com. v. Lovett, 4
Clark (Pa.). 5 (1831); State v. Wil-
liarfii, 2 Tenn., io8 (18o8); open
and notorious lewdness, Regivo v.
Harris, ii Cox C. C., 659 (1871);
Peak v. State, Io Humph. (Tenn.),
99 (1t849); State v. Moore, i Swan
(Tenn.), 136 (I85I); keepinga disor-
derly house to the common nui-
sance and disturbance of the com-
munity, Hunter v. Com., 2 S. &. iA.
(Pa.), 298 (1816); State v. Evans, 3
Iredell (N. C.), 6o3 (1845). In
many States where a code has been
adopted the application of the com-
mon law is thereby revoked and
there can be no common law of-
fences.
In Pennsylvania, however, to
avoid this result, under the Code
of March 31, 186o, P. L., 425 178,
it is provided that "every felony,
misdemeanor or offence whatever,
not specially provided for in this
act, may and shall be punished as
heretofore." By reason of thispro-
vision an indictment will still lie
against a woman as a common
scold in Pennsylvania, Com. v.
Mohn, supra.
* So long as one can find a prece-
dent there is little or no difficulty
in determining whether or not a
given state of facts can be punished
at common law in the absence of
a positive law or statute. But
where no precedent exists in the
books the question becomes more
difficult. Particularly is this true
when the circumstances and con-
ditions constituting the offence
complained of are in nowise analo-
gous to any circumstances or con-
ditions known at common law.
For example, a school board was
unknown in the machinery of gov-
ernment at common law; so, also,
election officers and a ballot such
as we now have were no part of the
system of control in England in the
days of the commofi law; hence it
became an interesting question to
decide whether the disturbance of
a meeting of such school directors,
or to commit a fraud by such elec-
tion officers, or to cheat at an elec-
tion can, in the absence of a statute
or precedent, be punished as crimes
under the old common law.
Two of these questions had been
decided in Pennsylvania. The one
relating to the disturbance of a
meeting of School Directors in
Campbell v. Com., supra, and the
other relating to the purity and
fairness of elections in Com. v.
McHale, 97 Pa., 397 (1881).
The want of precedents in the
judicial history of England must
not limit our courts in dealing with
such offences. The. want of pre-
cedents in England arises largely
from the growth of cities and towns,
the development of commerce and
trade, changes in the relations of
men and things, and the evolution
of government which have created
new conditions of crime. In some
cases it is due to the enactment of
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special laws with very severe pen-
alties, which were rendered neces-
sary when the changed circum-
stances of society brought oppor-
tunities for the commission of
crimes theretofore unknown and
impossible. In such cases, although
these crimes contravened certain
broad principles of the common
law, indictments were of course
brought under the statutes notwith-
standing the power under the com-
mon law to punish them. These
statutes were merely declaratory of
the common law. Wherever these
statutes may not be in force and
the common law is recognized,
of course indictments could be
brought notwithstanding the ab-
sence of common law precedents:
State v. Briggs, i Aikens (Vt.) 226
(1826); Loomis v. Edgarton, 19
Vend. (N.Y.) 419 (1838) and Coni.
v. Chapman, 13 Met. (Mass.) 68
(1847). There are certain broad
principles of the common law
which are recognized as the basis
of indictability in the absence of
precedents. All offences destruc-
tive or obstructive against govern-
ment or public justice, or against
public morals or the public peace
can be indicted as common law
offences in the absence of statute
law or precedents. In fact what-
ever is provocative of a public dis-
turbance, or consists of a malicious
injury to the property of another,
in such a way as to provoke a
violent retaliation, or constitutes a
public scandal or indecency, or is
a breach of official duty, can be in-
dicted as an offence at common law:
Walsh z. State, 65 Ill., 58 (1872).
The test is not whether prcedents
can be found in the books, but
whether the acts complained of
injuriously affect the public police
and economy: Com. v. McHale,
stepbra.
Having considered the subject of
what are common law offences, we
will next take up the other matter
which is decided in the case of
Com. v. Randolph, viz., solicita-
tions to commit crime. A mere
intent to commit crime, as long as
it is kept within the breast of the
offender, is beyond the reach of
the law, for it cannot undertake to
regulate the thoughts and intents
of the heart.' The best it can do is
to punish open acts. For the rest
it trusts the people to the refining
influences of Christian education:
Smith v. Com., 54 Pa., 209 (.867).
The intention to corrupt an officer
is not punishable, but when that
intention is evidenced by an overt
act, such as a solicitation, the de-
fendant has done his part towards
consummating the guilt and may
be punished therefor: Barefield v.
State, 14 Ala., 6o6 (1848).
In Schofield's Case, Cald., 397,
Lord MANSFIELD said: "So long
as an act rests on bare intention,
it is not punishable, but immedi-
ately when an act is done the law
judges not ouly of the act done,
but the intent with which it is
done, and if accompanied with an
unlawful and malicious intent,
though the act itself would other-
wise have been innocent, the intent
being criminal, the act becomes
criminal and punishable."
The overt act which the law will
recognize and take hold of is an
attempt or a solicitation, which in
a certain sense is a species of
attempt.
In i Bishop on Criminal Law,
7th ed., 767, it is said that "A
common form 'of attempt is the
solicitation of another to commit a
crime; the act which is a necessary
ingredient in every offence, con-
sisting in the solicitation;" and in
. 768 that all sufficiently direct
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solicitations to commit any of the
heavier offences are punishable at-
tempts. It is within established
principles to hold that, in propor-
tion to the gravity of the particular
crime, the solicitation, in order to
come within the law's group, may
be less direct
In State v. Avery, 7 Conn., 266
(1828) the Court said that a solici-
taion is an act and should be con-
sidered as an offence.
The Supreme Court of New York
in People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 133 (1843)
said that if the arson had been
committed, which the defendant
solicited another to perform, the
solicitation would have been
merged in an, actual felony. There
would been a principal arson by
one hnd an accessorial offence by
this defendant. The attempt of
the latter was to have both crimes
committed; and the question of
-principil and accessory being elimi-
nated from the case, I see nothing
against cofnsidering the matter in
the ordinary way, that what a man
does by another, he does by him-
self; in other words the solicitation
by the defendant was the same
thing as if he had taken steps pre-
paratory to setting the building on
fire himself. An attempt may be
immediate; but it is very often a
remote effort or indirect measure
taken with intent to affect an ob-
ject.
An approved writer on criminal
'law speaks of solicitation as be-
longing to a class of attempts.
As regards the requisites of an
indictment for solicitation, Bishop,
in his work on Criminal Law, 7th
Ed., Vol. I., 768, says: "The law
as adjudgedholds andhasheld from
the beginning, in all this class of
cases, an indictment sufficient
which simply charges that the de-
fendant at the time and place men-
tion~d, ' falsely, wickedly, and un-
lawfully did solicit and incite 'a
person name to commit the sub-
stantive offence, without any fur-
tlier specification of overt acts. It
is in vain, then, to say that mere
solicitation, the mere entire thing
which need be averred against a
defendant as the ground for his con-
viction, is no offence."
We have now considered the
question of intent and seen at what
stage the law will take notice of the
intention when it has progressed
beyond the breast of the offender,
and is declared by some overt act,
and we have seen thata solicitation
is, in substance, if not in reality,
a species of attempt.
The general rule on the subject
of the indictability of attempts is
the one laid down by Baron PARKI
in Rex v. Roderick, 7 C. & P., 795
(1837), and adopted by Russell on
Crimes, p. 84, which is as follows:
"An attempt to commit a misde-
meanor is a misdemeanor whether
the offence is created by statute, or
was an offence at common law."
From this rule we would draw the
inference that solicitations in gen-
eral to commit a crime are indict-
able, and on examining the cases,
we will see that the weight of au-
thority supports that proposition.
In the principal case which we
are considering there is a dictum
which would seem to narrow the
scope of indictments for solicita-
tions to commit crimes and limit
them to solicitations to commit fel-
onies. The decided cases seem to
be against this dictum.
Chief Justice HorT said in Re-
gina v. Turvey, Holt, 365 (i7o3),
"To persuade and solicit is a
crime."
In Rex v. Plympton, 2 Ld. Ray-
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mond, 1377 (1725), the Court said
,that it is indictable to promise
money to a member of a munici-
pal corpbration for ,his vote at an
election of said corporation, al-
though nothing is done in pursu-
ance thereof. This would be but a
solicitation to commit a misde-
meanor.
In Rex v. Lawley, Fitzgibbon,
263 (i73o), it was held that an in-
dictment charging defendant with
endeavoring to dissuade a witness,
the defendant knowing that J. C.
had been indicted for forgery, was
good.
In Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burrows,
2494 (1769), the defendant was in-
dicted for soliciting a privy coun-
sellor to obtain an office for
him.
In Rex v. Higgins, 2 East, 5
(18Ol), there was an indictment for
soliciting another to steal and em-
bezzle from his employer. Held to
be good, although nothing was done
in pursuance thereof, as such of-
fences have a tendency to a breach
of the peace. In this case the judge
turned the decision on the broad
principle that it tended to a breach
of the peace, and also intimated fur-
ther that a solicitation to commit a
misdemeanor was indictable by
saying, '" all these cases prove that
inciting another to commit a mis-
demeanor is itself a misdemeanor,
a forliori, therefore it must "be
such to incite another to commit
felony."
The case of State v. Caldwell, 2
Tyler (Vt) 212 (1802), was an in-
dictment for advising and counsel-
ling another to resist a sheriff who
was in the act of making a levy.
Held to support an indictment for
impeding and hindering a civil
officer in the execution of his
duty.
U. S. v. Lyles, 4 Cranch C. C.,
469 (x834), decided that a solicita-
tion to commit an assaulz and bat-
tery on another amounted to a mis-
demeanor at common law.
In State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836),
the Court said that soliciting a wit-
ness to stay away from a public
prosecution is indictable as a mis-
demeanor at common law, although
such witness had not been regu-
larly served with a subpoena, but
who was known to the defendant to
be a material witness. And in ad-
dition they said that they had no
hesitation in holding that the solic-
tation of another to commit an
offence should, with few exceptions,
be indicted as a misdemeanor at
common law.
People v. Bush, 4 Hill (N. Y.),
133 (1843), was an indictment for
soliciting another to commit arson.
Bishop, in his work on Criminal
Law, 7th Ed., Vol. II, ? 20 (note),
says that, although this was under
a statute, yet the statute was merely
declaratory of the common law.
In Barefield v. State, 14 Ala.,
6o6 (1843), it was said that the law
abhors the least tendency to cor-
ruption, and at common law all at-
tempts to bribe, though unsuccess-
ful, were indictable.
In State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9
(1847), which was an indictment
for soliciting a witness not to attend
a trial, the Court said that the at-
tempt, whether successful or not,
to obstruct the administration of
justice, is a substantive offence
punishable by common law. Com.
v. Reynolds, 14 Gray (Mass.), 87
(1859), is to the same effect.
In the New York case of McDer-
mott v. People, 5 Park C. C., 102
(r86o), the prisoner collected certain
materials in his room and then
solicited another to make use of
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them in burning A's barn. Held,
atrming People v. Bush, saufra,
that this proof warranted a convic-
tion for an attempt.
Regina v. Quail, x F. & F., 1O76
(1866), was an indictment for incit-
ing a servant to steal some silk
from his employer. Held, to be
good even if servant purposely sub-
'mitted to the solicitation with intent
to betray the defendant. Regina v.
Gregory, io Cox C. C., 459 (1867),
is to the same effect, and decides
that the mere act of soliciting is
indictable as a misdemeanor.
In State v. Ellis, 33 N. J. L., 102
(1868), there was an indictment for
- offering a bribe to a member of
Councils. Held, that the common
law offence of bribery is indictable,
and that the offence is complete
@vhen the offer is made, although
in- a matter over which the public
officer has no jurisdiction.
In Walsh v. People, 65 Ill., 58
(1872), the defendant was indicted
for a proposal, made by himself,
to receive a bribe to influence his
,action as alderman. The Court
said: "We are of the opinion that
it is a misdemeanor to propose to
receive a bribe. It must be regarded
as an inciting to offer one and a
solicitation to commit an offence.
This at common law is a misde-
meanor. Inciting another to the
commission ofan indictable offence-
though without success, is a mis-
.demeanor."
Regina v. Ransford, 13 Cox C. C.,
,9 (1874), was an indictment for
-writing and sending a letter to a
boy with the intent to incite him
ito commit an unnatural offence.
Rurj.Y, C. B., said: "I am clearly
of opinion, in point of law, that any
attemPt to commit a misdemeanor'
is in itself a misdemeanor, and I
am also of opinion that to incite or
even solicit another person to com-
mit a felony or to do any act with
intent to induce another to commit
such offence, is a misdemeanor."
In State v. Ames, 64 Maine, 386
(1875), the Court said: "That it is
a crime-known to the common law
to induce a witness to absent him-
self from a court where he is
legally bound to appear to give
testimony upon a criminal process
there pending, is too clear for argu-
ment and too well settled to require
the citation of authorities." The
use of persuasive means, thus .to,
obstruct the course of justice, is an
overt act toward the consummation
of a criminal purpose, and is in-
dictable, whether or not the of-
fender succeed in his attempt.
Com. v. Flogg, 135 Mass., 545
(1883), was an indictment for solicit-
ing another to set fire to a barn and
offering money for so doing. Held,
that it is an indictable offence at
common law for one to counsel and
solicit another to commit a felony
or other aggravated offence, al-
though the solicitation is of no
effect and the crime is not com-
mitted.
With regard to the principle laid
down in Com. v. Randolph, that a
solicitation to commit murder is a
misdemeanor at common law,while
abundantly sustained by principle
and authority, yet there seems to
have been but very few cases of
this kind either in the United
States or in England.
In addition to the principal case
and the one referred to therein,
there is the case of Rex v. Guy,
mentioned in 2 East, 22. I am in-
formed by the District Attorney of
Philadelphia County that there is
such an indictment now pending in
this city, and that it is the only case
which has ever arisen there.
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This want of authorities should
be considered, I think, to result
more from the heinousness of the
crime than from any doubt as to its
indictability.
The doctrine which we have just
considered andwhich is maintained
by .Mr. Bishop and a large number
of cases both in this country and in
England is limited somewhat by
Mr. Wharton, in the 9th Ed. of
his work on "Criminal Law," P 179,
where he says: "Are solicitations
to commit crime independently in-
dictable? They certainly are, as
has been seen, when they in them-
selves involve a breach of the
public peace, as is the case with
challenges to fight and seditious
addresses. They are also indict-
able when their object is interfer-
ence with public justice, as where
a resistance to the execution of a
judicial writ is counseled or perjury
is advised, or the escape of a pris-
oner is encouraged, or the corrup-
tion of a public officer is sought.
. . . They are indictable, also,
when they are in themselves of-
fences against public decency, as is
the case with solicitations to com-
mit so doing;" but subsequently
adds this limitation: '"And the
better opinion is that, where the
solicitation is not in itself a sub-
stantive offence, or where there
has been no progress made towards
the consummation of the independ-
ent offence attempted, the question
whether the solicitation is by itself
the subject of penal prosecution
must be answered in the negative."
The judge who delivered the
opinion of the lower Court in Com.
v. Randolph said, in answer to this:
'" I confess I do not understand him
when he speaks of solicitations
which ' themselves involve a breach
of the public peace.' He must
mean 'a solicitation which tends to
a breach of the peace.' A mere
solicitation cannot involve a breach
of the peace. A solicitation to
commit murder is a solicitation to
do an act which if done would be a
breach of the public peace . ..
He begs the whole question, how-
ever, when he says that a solicita-
tion is indictable only when it is a
substantive offence. If it is indict-
able, then it is a substantive of-
fence. If it is a substantive offence,
then it is indictable. We can learn
nothing from this argument based
on the idea of substantive offences."
Regina v. Daniel, 6 Mod., Too
(1703), which was an indictment
for soliciting an apprentice to leave
his master, and Regina v. Calling-
wood, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1116 (1704),
which are often sited in opposition
to the indictability of solicitations,
did not decide that question be-
cause the case went off on other
grounds. In fact, in the first case
Lord HoT says that perhaps an
indictment would lie for the evil
act of persuading another to steal.
The case of Coni. v. Smith, 54
Pa., 209 (1867), apparently decides
that a solicitation to commit a mis-
demeanor is not indictable. The
judge cites, in his opinion, the case
of Rex v. Butler, 6 C. & P., 368
(1834), which was an indictment
for soliciting a woman to lie down
on a bed and then getting upon
her. This case was, in substance,
says Bishop in his work on Criminal
Law, 7th Ed., Vol. I, , 768, a solici-
tation of the woman to allow de-
fendant to commit an assault upon
her. Such a count would be bad,
for if she consented, there would
be no assault. It could not be in-
dicted as a solicitation to commit
adultery, because that is no crime
in England. The case of Com. v.
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Smith is, therefore, only authority
for saying that a solicitation to
commit adultery is not punishable
in Pennsylvania, and ought not to-
be considered an authority for the
proposition that a solicitation to
commit a misdemeanor is not in-
dictable.
In Brockway v. People, 2 Hill
(N. Y.), s6I (I842), the Court held
that the renting of a house for the
purposes of pr6stitution, was not
an indictable offence. It said that
every act done in furtherance of a
misdemeanor, is not the subject of
indictment; but to constitute it
such, it must tend directly and im-
mediately, if not necessarily, to the
commission of the misdemeanor.
McDade v. People, 29 Mich., 50
(1874), decided that a statute: pun-
ishing the setting fire to a building
with the intent that it should be
burned, or the attempt by any
other means to cause the building
to be burned, will not warrant a
prosecution for an attempt based
on solicitation alone.
The case of Cox v. People, 82
Ill., i9 (1876), seems to follow the
opinion of Mr. Wharton, in saying
that a solicitation to commit crime
is not in itself an offence, unless
the offence is of such a character
that its solicitation tends to a
breach of the peace or the corrup-
tion of the body politic. But Mr.
Wharton went further, and said that
the solicitation must involve a
breach of the peace. It was held
in this case that a solicitation to
commit incert is not indictable.
Mr. Wharton approves of this
case; but says that a solicitation to
commit sodomy is indictable, be-
cause it is in itself an offence
against public decency. It may
well be asked, as was said in Com.
v. Randolph: "At what point in
libidinous crimes does he draw the
line of 'public decency? ' "
State v. Baller, 26 W. Va., 9o
(i885), gives a very exhaustive
treatise on the the whole subject.
The case of Lamb v. State, 67
Md., 524 (r887), is only authority
for holding that a mere solicitation
to commit a misdemeanor is not in
itself a misdemeanor, and that in
the face of a strong dissent.
Hicks v. Coin., 86 Va., 223 (1889),
was a case in which the evidence
showed a procurement of some
poison, and an ineffectual solicita-
tion of a third party to put it in
the drink of the intended victim.
.Held, that "such acts are not an
attempt, but only a preparation."
To my mind some of his arguments
to show the difference between an
attempt and a preparation, are very
finely drawn, and hardly con-
vincing. In the opinion in that
case the judge refers to Stabler v.
Com., 95 Pa., 318 (i88o), as an
authority, but it decided that the
mere delivery of poison to a person,
and soliciting him to place itin the
spring of another, is not "an at-
tempt to administer poison " with-
in the meaning of the Act of March
3, i86o, P. L. 403, 82. However,
in another count of the same
indictment, the defendant was
charged with soliciting A. B. to ad-
minister a certain poison to C. D.
and other persons unknown, and
this count was sustained, MIRCUR,
J., saying: "The conduct of the
plaintiff in error, as testified to by
the witness, undoubtedly shows an
offence for which an indictment
will lie without any further act
having been committed."
The Court said in Com. v. Ran-
dolph," We have, however, learned
from the examination of the au-
thorities already made, that there
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are crimes which it is a misde-
meanor at common law.to solicit a
person to commit. All the author-
ities noticed, including Mr. Whar-
ton, agree on that. The only diffi-
culty is to determine just what
crimes, or what class of crimes, it
is criminal to solicit or incite an-
other to commit."
In Com. v. Willard, 22 Pick.,
(Mass.), 478 (1839), Chief Justice
SHAW said, "It is difficult to draw
any precise line of distinction be-
tween the cases in which the law
holds it a misdemeanor to counsel,
entice or induce another to commit
crime and when it does not. In
general it has been considered as
applying to cases of felony, though
it has been held that it does not
depend upon the mere legal and
technical distinction between felony
and misdemeanor. One consider-
ation, however, is manifest in all
the cases, and that is, that the of-
fence proposed to be committed by
the counsel, advice or enticement
of another is of a high and aggra-
vated character tending to breaches
of the peace or other great disorder
and violence, being usually what
are considered mala in se, or crim-
inal in themselves, in contradis-
tinction to mala prohibi/a, or acts
otherwise indifferent than as they
are restrained by positive law."
Judge PAXSON, in Com. v. Jones,
31 Legal Int. (Pa.), 332 (r874), said,
that there may be, perhaps, a dis-
tinction between misdemeanors
which are mala in se and such as
are mala prohibila, as in the case
of acts which are not per se penal,
but made the subject of a statutory
fine, as a matter of municipal reg-
ulation.
As a result of my examination of,
the cases bearing on the subject of
solicitations I should say that a
solicitation to commit a crime,
whether it be a felony or a misde-
meanor, is indictable unless it be
some offence which because of its
"little magnitude cannot have the
appendage of attempt," examples
of which would b4 solicitations to
make illegal sales of liquor: Com.
v. Willard, supra, and were police
offences, etc.
The wisdom and indeed the ne-
cessity of punishing one who solic-
its the commission of crime was,
perhaps, never better demonstrated
than by President LINCOLN during
1863 in defending his action in hav-
ing sent Vallandigham across the
rebel line forhaving made a speech
soliciting disloyalty. Mr. LINCOLN
said, "Must I shoot asimple-minded
soldier boy who deserts, while I
must not touch a hair of the wily
agitator who induces him to desert?
This is none the less injurious when
effected by getting father or brother
or friend into a public meeting,
and there working upon his feelings
until he is persuaded to write the
soldier boy that he is fighting in a
bad cause, for a wicked administra-
tion of a contemptible government,
too weak to arrest and punish him
if he shall desert. I think that in
such a case to silence the agitator
and save the boy is not only con-
stitutional, but is withal a great
mercy."
C. PERCY WILCOX.
